Constitutional Law: Fourteenth Amendment: Challenging the South Carolina Bar Exam. (Richardson v. McFadden) by Miller, Thomas L.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 60
Issue 4 Summer 1977 Article 9
Constitutional Law: Fourteenth Amendment:
Challenging the South Carolina Bar Exam.
(Richardson v. McFadden)
Thomas L. Miller
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas L. Miller, Constitutional Law: Fourteenth Amendment: Challenging the South Carolina Bar Exam. (Richardson v. McFadden), 60
Marq. L. Rev. 1135 (1977).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol60/iss4/9
RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law - Fourteenth Amendment - Challeng-
ing the South Carolina Bar Exam - The bar examination,
in most jurisdictions, is the final hurdle to overcome before one
is licensed to practice law.' The examination as a means of
screening candidates for the bar has received its share of praise
in that it protects the public interest. A license to practice law
represents to the public that a person so endowed has the skills
necessary to deal with various aspects of the law.2 Such a sys-
tem has also been subject to a fair share of criticism, most
notably that the successful completion of a three year law
school program is a better measure of competency than the
memorization required to pass a three day bar examination. 3
When disproportionate numbers of blacks failed the South
Carolina bar examination, four of the examinees challenged its
constitutionality in Richardson v. McFadden. 4 Both the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment were the bases for the claims set forth by the examinees.
Three challenges to the examination were brought up on appeal
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, two of which were
brought by the examinees and one by the bar examiners. The
examinees maintained first, that the exam was not sufficiently
job related to satisfy the standards of either Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19645 or the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Secondly, two of the examinees
claimed to have been denied their right to due process under
the fourteenth amendment, since they had been refused pass-
ing scores on the exam due to the alleged arbitrariness of the
bar examiners' grading standards. The third challenge was
brought by the examiners themselves on cross-appeal, in which
they raised the question of whether the review procedure avail-
1. Wisconsin, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Montana maintain a "diploma privi-
lege," granting license to students who successfully complete the legal curriculum at
schools so recognized in these states.
2. Petition of DeOrsey, 112 R.I. 536, 312 A.2d 720, 724-25 (1973).
3. See E. Bell, Do Bar Examinations Serve a Useful Purpose?, 57 A.B.A.J. 1215
(1971). See also Comment, Admission To The Pennsylvania Bar: The Need For Sweep-
ing Change, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 945 (1970).
4. 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1974).
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able upon failure of the exam was sufficient to satisfy due
process.6
The first challenge was to the job relatedness of the bar
examination. The controversy centered on which standards the
court should apply. The examinees conceded that Title VII by
its own terms did not apply to the bar exam, presumably be-
cause the bar examiners were not thought to be an employment
agency under Title VII's definition.' The examinees' efforts,
however, were concentrated on convincing the court to utilize
Title VII standards, even though the challenge was brought on
constitutional grounds Generally, such standards would re-
quire that a validation study of the examination be conducted,
as pointed out in Douglas v. Hampton.10 Three specific tech-
niques are commonly employed to prove the validity of testing
procedures: criterion-related, construct, and content." The
Richardson court found that the bar examiners had failed to
validate the examination by criterion-related procedures.12 The
6. 540 F.2d at 746. The district court had abstained from deciding this issue,
maintaining that such an issue should most properly be decided by the South Carolina
Supreme Court.
7. 540 F.2d at 747.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (1974). See also note 47 infra.
9. Title VII is used to enforce claims of employment discrimination brought under
it. Between 1964 and 1972, public employers were not covered by Title VII require-
ments. This inequity was resolved when Congress enacted the Equal Opportunity
Employment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 102 (1972). Due to the fact that
some claims against public employers were filed prior to this amendment, thereby
foreclosing such plaintiffs from direct Title VII relief, some courts utilized Title VII
standards in dealing with constitutional claims. Simply put, upon the showing of
disproportionate racial impact resulting from an employment exam, Title VII stan-
dards would go into effect.
10. 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11. Id. at 984. The Douglas court defines such techniques as follows:
"Empirical" [or "criterion-related"] validity is demonstrated by identifying
criteri:a that indicate successful job performance and then showing a correlation
between test scores and those criteria. "Construct" validity is proven when an
examination is structured to determine the degree to which applicants possess
identifiable characteristics that have been determined to be important to suc-
cessful job performance. "Content" validity is established when the content of
the test closely approximates the tasks to be performed on the job by the appli-
cant.
Studies developed by the American Psychological Association were used by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Council (EEOC) in drawing up its guidelines for the review
of such examinations. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1 et seq. (1973). These guidelines are widely
used and were approved by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
12. 540 F.2d at 746-47. As pointed out in the EEOC guidelines, criterion-related
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question remaining was whether the examinees would be al-
lowed to invoke the more probing Title VII standards in an
equal protection challenge in order to invalidate the South Car-
olina bar examination.
The examinees relied on the Title VII requirements as set
forth in Walston v. County School Board. 13 In that case a deseg-
regation plan had been ordered for the county, to begin in the
1970-71 school year. Teachers were required to pass a certain
test put out by the Educational Testing Service (ETS), even
though ETS would not recommend that such a test be used as
the sole determining factor for granting employment. 4 The
Walston court decided that the school district's history of dis-
crimination, together with an exam that disproportionately
excluded blacks from teaching, allowed teachers to employ
Title VII standards in challenging such an exam. The school
board subsequently was unable to fulfill the criterion-related
validity required in the use of such an exam.5
The Richardson court instead chose to rely on the require-
ments handed down recently by the Supreme Court in
Washington v. Davis.6 A fifth amendment due process chal-
lenge had been brought when a disproportionate number of
blacks failed an exam that would have granted them participa-
tion in a District of Columbia police training course. The Court
held that the invidious discrimination forbidden by the Consti-
tution is not proven merely by a showing of disproportionate
racial impact."' A racially discriminatory purpose must also be
shown." This more probing judicial review that is triggered in
Title VII challenges by showing discriminatory racial impact
was not required by the Court in constitutional challenges,
absent a showing of discriminatory purpose in addition to dis-
criminatory impact. 9 Since there was no proof that the test
reflected such a discriminatory purpose in Davis, the constitu-
validity is to be utilized unless shown to be an infeasible undertaking, in which case
construct validity is to be used. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1973).
13. 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974).
14. Id. at 921.
15. Id. at 924.
16. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
17. Id. at 242. The Court qualified such an impact as follows: "Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimi-
nation forbidden by the Constitution."
18. Id. at 239.
19. Id. at 247.
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tional challenge failed. Although the Richardson examinees
had shown the existence of a disproportionate racial impact,"
the problem came when they attempted to prove purposeful
discrimination. The examinees claimed that the untimely
elimination of the diploma privilege, the reciprocity rule, and
reading law2' was purposefully brought about to prevent blacks
from practicing law in South Carolina. The court viewed such
evidence as merely circumstantial, accepting instead the bar
examiners' contention that such measures had been taken to
upgrade the quality of applicants accepted by the South Caro-
lina State Bar. 2 Most importantly, the court acknowledged
that there had been no contention by the examinees of prohibi-
tive state laws or standards with respect to the practice of law
by blacks.2 3 Since the examinees could not show discrimina-
tory purpose, the more probing judicial review of Title VII was
unavailable to them. They were thereby relegated to attacking
the constitutionality of the bar examination within the con-
fines of the fourteenth amendment equal protection standard
for job relatedness.
A fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis of a
state's discriminatory conduct is performed by the use of either
a strict scrutiny or a rational basis review.24 Where suspect
classifications are created or fundamental interests have been
infringed upon, a strict scrutiny review is applied, whereby the
state must show a compelling interest before its conduct will
be upheld. Absent the creation of suspect classifications or
infringement of fundamental interests, the proper standard of
review is rational basis. Such review requires only that the
classification proposed by the state bear a fair and substantial
relationship to the legitimate purpose being effectuated.
Richardson looked to Tyler v. Vickery," a bar examination
20. Taking all of the South Carolina bar examination applicants from 1968 to 1972,
95.4% of the whites passed, while only 55.6% of the blacks passed..Brief for Appellants
at 3, Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976).
21. Each of these methods serves to avoid the taking of the bar exam. The diploma
privilege grants admission to the bar upon successful completion of the school's legal
curriculum. Reciprocity between participating states allows one state to accept an-
other's attorneys into its own bar. Reading law under the supervision of an attorney
would qualify the student, where permitted, to practice law.
22. 540 F.2d at 748 n.7.
23. Id. at 747.
24. See, e.g., 60 MARQ. L. Rav. 129, 131 n.15 (1976).
25. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976). Even more
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equal protection challenge in the fifth circuit, to determine
which basis of review to apply. Tyler pointed out that the mere
showing of disproportionate impact of the bar exam upon
blacks was not enough to create a suspect classification."6 Since
discriminatory intent was not proven, strict judicial scrutiny
was not appropriate. The Tyler court applied the rational basis
review and found a rational relationship between the bar exam
and the state's regulation of bar admissions. 21 Such a basis of
review was adopted by the court in Richardson.
In Richardson, the bar examiners' attempts to relate exam
questions to minimal legal competency helped to fulfill the
requirements of the rational basis review. The court, however,
placed substantial reliance on the testimony of two experts
that content validity existed in the bar examination, thus satis-
fying the rational basis review. A claim of content validity
must be viewed carefully in order to determine what tasks a
test is said to be approximating. The professional standards
employed by the American Psychological Association indicate
that content validity can be "demonstrated by tests whose con-
tent closely approximates tasks to be performed on the job by
the applicant. '2 8 The experts in Richardson claimed that the
content validity of the bar exam was to be found in its approxi-
mation of tasks already performed in law school. However, the
Richardson court indicated that the logic of such an interpreta-
tion of content validity, if carried too far, could result in look-
ing merely to a student's performance in school as an adequate
recently, in Pettit v. Gingerich, 45 U.S.L.W. 2421 (D.C. Md. Feb. 22, 1977), the U.S.
District Court for Maryland decided that an equal protection challenge to the bar
exam, when there is shown to be a disproportionate impact on blacks, but no proof of
discriminatory intent, will be subjected merely to a rational basis review.
26. 517 F.2d at 1099.
27. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), as in Davis, supra note 16, the Court stated that in an equal
protection challenge, absent a showing of discriminatory intent, there can be no equal
protection violation. In neither case did the Court explicitly state whether a rational
basis review would still be available after the finding of no intent to discriminate and
no consequent strict scrutiny review. But language in both cases can be construed to
imply either a rational basis review or an examination to determine whether an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent can be drawn. Tyler and Richardson, on the other hand,
clearly set out the entitlement of claimants to a rational basis review, despite a failure
to show discriminatory intent. Whether such a distinction makes a practical difference
in result remains to be seen.
28. 426 U.S. at 247 n.13. See also Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 984 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
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measure of tasks performed. At that point, the value of any bar
exam might well become questionable.2 9
In its adherence to the rational basis review, Richardson
could be said to have adopted the disapproving attitude of
Davis" toward cases that called for a "demonstrably job re-
lated basis" of review.31 Had such a basis of review been recog-
nized and accepted, the bar examiners in Richardson would
have had the heavy burden of coming forward "with convincing
facts establishing a fit between the qualification and the job. '3 2
Richardson required only the minimum, the rational basis re-
view; satisfaction of this review resulted in the successful de-
fense of the bar exam from. fourteenth amendment attack.
Richardson further acknowledged that to meet the demands
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, a rea-
sonable relationship between the passing score of 70 and mini-
mal legal competency had to exist.3 The bar examiners em-
ployed varied methods to assign scores to the exams. The court
admitted that such subjectivity constituted an "unprofessional
approach." 34 Yet, because the bar examiners did design their
own questions and assigned their own judgmental scoring of
minimal legal competency, the court said that the demands of
equal protection had been satisfied.
Two of the examinees next contended that the bar examin-
ers had arbitrarily applied their own standards in determining
which of the examinees had actually passed or failed. Each
examinee was graded by six bar examiners. A cumulative aver-
age was then determined, with the grade being rounded up to
the next whole number if the grade was .5 or better. Following
such standards, the two examinees should have passed, yet
both of them failed. The reason presented was that despite
29. 540 F.2d at 749 n.11.
30. 426 U.S. at 44-45.
31. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). See also Comment,
Equal Protection Challenges to the Bar Examination, 1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 531, wherein
the author develops an argument for such a "demonstrably job related basis" of review,
which he refers to as the "active rational basis" review. This third basis of review,
utilized in some of the lower courts, is somewhat stronger than the rational basis of
review. There may be legitimate state interests allegedly prompted by an exam, but if
personal rights are in danger, courts which employ this third basis will put the burden
on the state to prove demonstrably that such an exam is job related.
32. 459 F.2d at 732.
33. 540 F.2d at 749.
34. Id. at 750 n.14.
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their "passing" cumulative scores, each examinee had failed in
the grading by three or more examiners. When it was pointed
out that certain examinees had failed only two examiners and
were therefore deemed to have failed overall, the Richardson
court decided that consistency was lacking. 5 Although the bar
examiners contended that brief written comments from each
examiner helped to explain these inconsistencies, the court
concluded that the objectivity strived for with numerical grad-
ing had been undermined. The actions by the bar examiners
were found to have been arbitrary and capricious. 6 The two
examinees were ordered admitted to the South Carolina bar,
for such actions violated their rights under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The court suggested that one method of dealing with such
arbitrary applications of standards has been employed by
North Carolina. Recent legislation has created statutory laws
requiring most agencies in North Carolina to establish mini-
mum procedural requirements in adopting, amending or re-
pealing administrative rules. 7 If the bar examiners qualify as
one of these agencies, then the standard the examiners would
employ in their determination of passing grades would have to
be filed with the Attorney General of North Carolina. 8 Not
only would students then know what constitutes a passing
grade, but they also would be informed by an announcement,
should any change in the standard be forthcoming.
The third challenge in Richardson was brought before the
fourth circuit by the examiners themselves, the district court
having abstained with respect to this issue. 9 A determination
was requested as to whether the lack of an "express provision
35. Id. at 751.
36. Attacking arbitrarily applied standards sometimes has strange results. See
Petition of DeOrsey, 112 R.I. 536, 312 A.2d 720, 723 (1973), where one of the unsuccess-
ful examinees pointed out to the court that eighit previously unsuccessful examinees
were admitted when the court allowed July 1972 exam standards to be applied to the
February 1973 exam. Still, the court refused this examinee's request that the February
1973 exam standards be applied to the July 1972 exam, thereby denying him admission
to the State Bar. See also Note, Recourse of an Examinee Upon Failing the Bar
Examination: A Bleak Affair, 18 How. L.J. 808 (1975).
37. N.C. Administrative Procedure Act; N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 150A (Cum. Supp.
1975).
38. See Comment, The North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act - The Ef-
fect on the North Carolina Board of Law Examiners, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 109 (1975).
39. 540 F.2d at 752.
[Vol. 60:11341140
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for review"" was violative of the examinees' due process rights.
Information gathered from bar examination procedures in
forty-eight jurisdictions indicated that thirty-four of them
made only a vague reference, if any, to review procedures." The
Richardson court recognized this paucity of information with
respect to review procedures. Despite the examiners' claim that
the state supreme court's inherent powers of review satisfied
due process, Richardson also refrained from deciding the issue.
Such a decision was left for the South Carolina Supreme Court,
with the implication that such powers of review might be found
to be insufficient to satisfy due process.42
The examiners further argued that the examinees' right to
reexamination satisfied due process. In Whitfield v. Illinois
Board of Law Examiners,43 despite an examinee's failing the
bar examination five times, his request to be allowed to review
his exam paper and to compare it with model answers was
rejected. Reexamination alone was held to be sufficient to sat-
isfy due process requirements. Despite such advocacy of reex-
aminatiori in Whitfield, Richardson maintained that "once is
enough"44 with respect to taking the bar exam. The court also
took it upon itself to first bring up and then reject the argument
that allowing examinees the opportunity for review would be
burdensome for the bar examiners." Perhaps in anticipation of
adverse rulings on the issue of review, after the initiation of this
suit the state had voluntarily established procedures for the
review of failing papers.46
The barriers to a successful challenge of the bar examina-
tion are many. Unless such an attack can qualify under the
requirements of a Title VII employment claim,47 a regulation
40. Id.
41. See Comment, Review of Failing Bar Examinations: Does Reexamination Sat-
isfy Due Process?, 52 B.U.L. Rxv. 286 (1972).
42. 540 F.2d at 752.
43. 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
44. 540 F.2d at 752.
45. But see 504 F.2d at 478.
46. 540 F.2d at 752.
47. An argument can be made that the Tyler court gave too narrow an interpreta-
tion to the Title VII definition of "employment agency," thereby excluding bar exam-
iners from Title VII challenges. The applicable section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (1974)
reads as follows:
The term "employment agency" means any person regularly undertaking with
or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure
employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such
a person.
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which has a disproportionate racial impact must also be shown
to have a discriminatory purpose to sustain an equal protection
challenge. If purposeful discrimination cannot be shown, then
disproportionate racial impact alone will, at best, trigger a ra-
tional basis standard of review, easily satisfied by bar examin-
ers. Depending on the amount of inconsistency and subjectivity
exhibited by the examiners in passing or failing examinees,
there may be sufficient arbitrariness displayed to overturn a
decision on individuals' entrance to the state bar. With respect
to review procedures, personal review by the examinees them-
selves might well be required to satisfy due process, unless the
state supreme court determines that its own inherent powers
of review are sufficient.
THOMAS L. MILLER
Labor Law-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Arbi-
tration Required After Expiration of Contract-In the re-
cent case of Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confec-
tionary Workers Union,I the Supreme Court held that a party
to a collective bargaining agreement may be required to arbi-
trate a dispute concerning severance pay pursuant to the arbi-
tration clause of the agreement, even though the dispute arose
after the agreement terminated and after the employer went
out of business at the plant employing the disputing employ-
ees. The Court decided that the employer's duty to arbitrate
survived the termination of the agreement and extended to
disputes which first arise after the employer-employee relation-
ship had been completely severed.
However, Nolde leaves a major question unanswered: The
majority opinion never states how the employer's legally en-
forceable obligation to arbitrate beyond the term of the con-
tract arises. The Court has previously held that the duty im-
posed on parties to submit disputes to arbitration is founded
in a collective bargaining agreement.2 But in Nolde the dispute
arose after the agreement had been terminated. Therefore, the
1. 97 S. Ct. 1067 (1977).
2. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); see
also Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 58 (1970), wherein the NLRB also states
that a party's obligation to arbitrate arises out of a contract.
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